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CONSUMER NEWS
By Douglas C. Nelson*

Insurance Brokerage Giant Exposed by
Consumer Fraud Charges
New York's Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, is fast
developing a reputation as a consumer fraud-busting, industrychanging crusader who gets fast, far-reaching results.' Spitzer's latest
lawsuit against the insurance brokerage giant, Marsh & McLennan
("Marsh"), provides a window into the previously "entrenched and
opaque" insurance industry. 2 The view is not pretty. Four days after
consumers first got a glimpse through this window Marsh's stock
price fell nearly forty-ei~ht percent, knocking $11.5 billion off the
company's market value. Allegations of bid-rigging, price fixing and
payoffs have left Marsh's very survival in doubt and, what's more,
the scandal is quickly spreading and implicating the biggest names in
insurance industry.
On April 5, 2004, the New York State's Attorneys General's
office received an anonymous letter stating that "[Marsh] is receiving
major income from directing business to preferred providers ...the
bigger the incentive, the more business they get." Spitzer's team
became increasingly intrigued as he considered the lack of federal
regulations governing the insurance industry, and the "notoriously
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cozy" relationship state regulators had developed with the industry.
Shortly thereafter, Spitzer's staff was reviewing Marsh's
internal e-mail and beginning to unravel the insurance industry's
secrets.7 What they found not only supported the allegations made by
the anonymous tipster, but went further revealing that Marsh, and the
insurance industry in general, had a made "kick-backs" and "bidrigging" a routine business practice.
Insurance brokers, such as Marsh, are hired by corporate
consumers to match their insurance needs with the most affordable
insurer. 9 Consumers pay the insurance broker for brokerage services
and, curiously, the insurer that wins the business also pays the
insurance broker.10 When and if this fee from the insurer is disclosed
to consumers, it is vaguely explained as a payment for "unspecified

services." 1

Although Marsh's marketing materials promise that "our
guiding principle is to consider our client's best interest in all
placements," the company's internal e-mails reveal that Marsh was
guided be a quite different principle-namely, the biggest kickback
wins the business. 2 Insurers were actually ranked by the profitability
of the kickbacks provided to Marsh. Meanwhile, Marsh brokers were
told by a Managing Director via e-mail, "I will give you clear
direction on who [we] are steering business to and who we are
steering business from."'' 3 Marsh's internal policies were also shared
with insurers who were told in no uncertain terms that the way to
increase their sales was to sweeten the deal with Marsh. 14 According
to a former Marsh executive, payments from insurers accounted for

6 Elkind, supra note 1. Unlike other financial institutions such as banks and
investment houses, insurance is not federally regulated. Why Insurance Needs a
Cleanup, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 1, 2004, at 128. However, a congressional bill

calling for national standards for the industry, called "SMART"' for State
Modernization & Regulatory Transparency, is currently pending in Congress. Id.
7 Elkind, supra note 1.
8id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

11 Id.

12See Elkind, supra note 1.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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one-half of the company's profits.15
Marsh's kickback program, however, is only part of the story.
Preferred insurers got more than "steering" in the form of
recommendations and salesmanship from Marsh brokers. In
September, Brown's staff uncovered e-mails showing how Marsh
made sure its favored insurer would win a particular deal. In one
case, ACE USA, an insurer, was prepared to bid $990,000 for a
casualty policy for Marsh's client, Fortune Brands. But e-mails
between ACE executives revealed that ACE then revised its bid to
$1,100,000 at Marsh's direction: "Original quote $990,000 ...We
were more competitive than AIG in price and terms. [Marsh]
to be less competitive, so
requested we increase premium to $1.iM 16
AIG does not loose [sic] the business .... ,
Spitzer's team found that Marsh routinely demanded inflated
bids, which Marsh called these "B quotes," from insurers to give
clients the impression that the process was competitive. 17 In one
instance, when ACE resisted providing "B quotes" an ACE VP was
told, again via e-mail, "I do not want to hear that you are not doing
'B' quotes or we will not bind anything [for ACE].' 18 Remarkably,
when one insurer refused to provide a bogus bid, Marsh9 simply made
up an inflated bid and submitted in the insurer's name.'
The gall of Marsh seemed to know no bounds. In an email
exchange with Munich-American Risk Partners, a Marsh broker
asked the insurer for a "live body" to make a bogus presentation to a
client in order to give the illusion of competition.2 0 The insurer
replied in all caps: "WE DON'T HAVE THE STAFF TO ATTEND
MEETINGS JUST FOR THE SAKE OF BEING A 'BODY.'
WHILE YOU MAY2 NEED 'A LIVE BODY,' WE NEED A 'LIVE
OPPORTUNITY.',, '
22
The culture at Marsh was notoriously secretive and arrogant.
Perhaps just the culture needed to foster such massive consumer

15 Vickers, supra note 3.
16 Elkind, supra note 1.
17
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20

Id.

2"

Elkind, supra note 1.

22 Vickers, supra note 3.
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fraud. Spitzer, who has been criticized in the past for his willingness
to cut deals and settle claims with corrupt companies, flatly refused
any further contact with Marsh leadership: 3 "the leadership of that
company is not a leadership I will talk to."' Shortly after Spitzer's
Marsh CEO Jeffery Greenberg was removed from his
comments,
24
post.
When Greenberg took over the top position at Marsh in
November of 1999, Wall Street lauded Greenberg's gregarious,
outgoing personality.
Greenberg was expected to be more
accessible and more communicative than his secretive predecessor,
A.J.C. "Ian" Smith.26 Instead, under Greenberg the company grew
even more secretive and aloof. 27 While Greenberg's friends claim
that he inherited major problems when he took over, he appeared to
be reluctant to change the arrogant culture of Marsh which permitted
fraud to fester.2 8 Former Marsh executives describe Greenberg as an
indecisive and detached leader who gave his managers free reign so
long as they were meeting their financial numbers. 29 But, said one
employee: "It's the
kind of place where if you don't meet or exceed a
30
goal, heads roll.",
Marsh is also the kind of place where executive interviews
include hours of questioning by a company psychiatrist. 3 1 These
interviews include questions like: "What's the worst thing that's ever
happened to you?" "What are your views on religion?" "Who do you
vote for?" 32 A former Marsh executive explains, they are "looking for
people who will fit in, lockstep, at the company." 33 Moreover,
employees must sign non-compete agreements each time they
exercise stock options and executives that leave the company risk
losing deferred compensation which Marsh builds into its
23 Elkind, supra note 1.
24

id.

25 Vickers, supra note 3.
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30 Vickers, supra note 3.
31 Id.
32 id.

33id.
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compensation plans. 34 As one former executive told a major
magazine, "Gee, I'd love to talk to you. There's a lot to say. But
they've got my money." 35 Other former executives accuse Marsh of
constantly monitoring internal phone calls and using private
investigators to spy on former executives.36
Perhaps no executive better personifies Marsh's arrogance
and gall than Marsh's Executive Director of Marketing, William
Gilman. 37 According to Spitzer's complaint Gilman oversaw Marsh's
bid-rigging scheme. Insurers dealing with Gilman were expected to
abide by "Billy's Rules" which were memorialized on a plaque that
hung in Gilman's office. 39 Billy's rules were: (1) No "no's" (meaning
insures were not to tell Marsh "no"); (2) Don't get stupid (meaning
do not question Marsh's tactics); (3) If you get stupid we will broom
your ass; and (4) Never think you own your business, you only rent
your business. Marsh owns you business. 0
Gilman and Marsh were able to wield this kind of power
because, after a series of acquisitions, Marsh was dominant in the
insurance brokerage industry. By the late 1990's Marsh controlled
42
forty percent of the world market. Marsh's dominance allowed
them to dictate pricing, control the way insurance products were
packaged and structured, and determine how premiums and payout
put it, "[t]hey have both
disbursements are handled.4 3 As a competitor
,,44
their clients and insurers by the cojones.
Since Spitzer launched his investigation, Marsh, Aon Corp.,
and Willis Group Holdings, who together control eighty percent of
the insurance brokerage industry, have announced that they will no
34 id.
35 id.
36 Vickers, supra note 3.

In July,

the company

purchased a private

investigation firm for $1.9 billion. Id. The purchase further fueled suspicions that
Marsh was keeping close tabs on its former and current employees. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.

4 Id.
41 Vickers, supra note 3.
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 Id.
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longer accept payments from insurers. 45 Willis' CEO called the
scandal, "the most important event ever for the insurance industry...
'46
How it responds will define the industry for years to come.
Besides facing drastically reduced stock prices, costly
lawsuits, and the threat of losing customers to smaller firms in the
wake of this scandal, the big three insurance brokers will also be
forced to learn how to conduct business without kick-backs and other
questionable tactics which have accounted for as much as one-half of
their profits. 47 In a variation on the cash based kick-back, Spitzer is
also investigating Aon for steering business to insurers who would
promise to purchase the insurance on their policies, called
reinsurance, from Aon. In other words, consumers were advised to
purchase insurance policies not because a particular policy
represented the best price and value to the consumer, but because the
consumer's policy would be reinsured by Aon.
Unfortunately, the consumer abuses that are starting come to
light are not limited to the big three insurance brokers. 49- Spitzer's
team is starting to close in on "mom-and-pop agencies that sell
insurance to small businesses and [individual] consumers" where
they have discovered a similar pattern of undisclosed incentives to
steer policies to particular insurers. 50 David Brown, a member of
Spitzer's team explains that, "[flor them, these types of backdoor
payments are very, very important . . . They've all grown up on

them." 5 He added, "[n]one of us knows what a world with insurance
price competition would look like, since its never existed.', 52 Industry
estimates of the percentage of revenue that independent insurance
agents derive from "contingent commissions" range from two to

41 Carrie Coolidge, Pulling the Plug on Marsh, FORBES, Nov. 15, 2004, at

126.
46 Id.
47

Vickers, supra note 3.

48

David Greising & Ameet Sachdev, Probe, Problems ChallengingAon, CHI.

TRIB., Dec. 12, 2004, at 1.
49 Suzanne Woolley, Insurance: Take a Good, Hard Look; Here's How the
Spitzer Investigations of the Industry Could Affect You, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 29,
2004, at 142.
50 Elkind, supra note 1.
51 Id.
52

Id.
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twenty percent.5 3
In the absence of federal regulations or legitimate industry
self-regulation, corporate and individual consumers alike need to be
aware that insurance brokers may be operating with a hidden agenda.
Although consumers may avoid the specter of "contingent
commissions" by simply electing to deal with insurance agents who
sell policies for a single company,54 this approach limits consumers'
choices and requires them to become experts in a complex, and
historically secretive, industry. Perhaps one day consumers will be
able to trust their independent insurance brokers to help them make
an informed choice between competing insurers. 5 5 In the meantime,
let the buyer beware.

Consumer Brings First-Ever RICO Suit
Against National Mover
What started out as a routine residential move from Atlanta to
Chicago erupted into a first-ever lawsuit against a national mover,
Mayflower Transit, Inc. ("Mayflower"), under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").5 6 Although a
federal jury ultimately found that the plaintiff failed to prove the
RICO portion of her case, 57 the Federal District Court's denial of
Mayflower's summary judgment motion put the moving industry on
notice that fraudulent movers may be within the reach of consumer
RICO actions.5 8
53 Coolidge, supra note 45.
54 Id.
55 Id.

56 Andrew Harris, National Mover Faces RICO Suit, 26 NAT'L L.J. 33, April
19, 2004, at Col. 1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),

18 U.S.C §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
57 Ameet Sachdev, Racketeering Verdict Rejected; Mayflower Guilty on
Contract, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2004, at 2.
58 "Industry officials can't recall a racketeering claim being brought to trial
against a reputable national moving company. They are closely watching Chen's
case because a judgment in her favor could result in a flurry of copycat suitssending their liability costs skyward." Ameet Sachdev, Client Won't Budge in Fight
Over Move, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1.

